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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.
ROBIN LANCE KAALOA,

:

Case No. 20050790-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

INTRODUCTION
Defense counsel performed deficiently when he cross-examined the State's
witness about three murders Kaaloa allegedly committed, allowed the State to admit
crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing
body, and failed to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or request a manslaughter
instruction. Moreover, this Court should reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel
because but for defense counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
the outcome of the trial would have been different.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL
PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
This Court should reverse because defense counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness when he: (A) elicited testimony from Shelly Smith

(Shelly) that Kaaloa had allegedly murdered three people; (B) allowed the State to admit
crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing
body; and (C) failed to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or request a
manslaughter instruction. Moreover, this Court should reverse because but for defense
counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial
would have been different. See supra at Part D.
A.

Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness When He Cross-Examinecl Shelly On Three Murders
Allegedly Committed By Kaaloa.
As explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the admission of prior bad acts evidence

"tends to skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process" and leads the finder of
fact to convict on "an improper basis," such as a belief that the defendant has a bad
character, likely acted in conformity with his bad character, and is therefore deserving of
punishment. State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988); see Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Accordingly, it is unreasonable for defense counsel to affirmatively admit evidence of his
client's prior crimes except, in rare instances, when the introduction of prior crimes
evidence could "'produce a result favorable to the accused.'" Aplt. Br. at 22-23 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Sweitzer, 395 A.2d 1376, 1383 (Pa. 1978)); see also State v. Cutcher,
244 N.E.2d 767 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969).
The State does not challenge the accuracy of Kaaloa's statement of the law. Aple.
Br. at 18. Instead, it argues Kaaloa's case is "inapposite" because, in Kaaloa's case, the
"jury certainly understood" the alleged murders evidence was based on "hearsay and
rumor, not fact," and defense counsel admitted the alleged murders evidence to show
2

Shelly had "a motive to lie," namely, she "was angry with" Kaaloa so she "spread
baseless inculpatory rumors and hearsay about him." Aple. Br. at 18-19.
The State's argument is based entirely on supposition and is not supported by the
record. It is difficult to see how questioning Shelly about the three alleged murders
would discredit Shelly rather than Kaaloa or why defense counsel would ever take such a
chance. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. The alleged murders evidence was highly prejudicial because
it accused Kaaloa of committing three murders very similar to the murder charged,
thereby undermining his strong claim of self-defense. See id. at 25-27, 43-47. In
comparison, Shelly's testimony that she heard Kaaloa make a potentially threatening
comment was virtually harmless. IdL Plus, any harm it caused could not have been
undone by discrediting her testimony alone. Because Barnes also testified he heard
Kaaloa make a potentially threatening comment, defense counsel would have had to
similarly discredit his testimony. R. 293:148-49.
Regardless, according to the State, defense counsel's reason for admitting the
alleged murders evidence was to discredit Shelly's testimony. Carrying out this supposed
plan, defense counsel admitted detailed information about the three alleged murders
without making any effort to discredit the evidence, contain the jury's consideration of it
through a limiting instruction, or explain how it could possibly help the defense. See
Aplt. Br. at 27-28, 46-47; R. 293-94. In other words, he let the alleged murders evidence
stand unchallenged and available to the jury for general consideration on the merits. Id.
By so doing, defense counsel did nothing to discredit Shelly's testimony. Id Instead, he
conveyed the impression that the evidence supporting the alleged murders was so reliable
3

and Kaaloa "was so guilty, no defense was available." State v. Lamoreaux, 525 P.2d
303, 305 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974). Thus, it is irrelevant whether defense counsel had some
unspoken strategic reason for admitting the alleged murders evidence because he acted
deficiently by leaving the jury "in the dark about it." Cutcher, 244 N.E.2d at 769.
It is also difficult to imagine a case in which the admission of highly prejudicial
prior crimes evidence by defense counsel without any explanation as to why it was
admitted would be considered effective assistance simply because the reason for
admitting the prior crimes evidence might have been obvious to the jury despite the lack
of guidance. Aple. Br. at 19. Even if such a case exists, this is not it.
From the jury's perspective, the alleged murders evidence was very believable
because it was completely uncontested. As explained previously, defense counsel
seemed to concede the truth of the alleged murders evidence by eliciting it in detail,
without challenging its reliability, limiting the scope of its admission, or explaining how
it could possibly benefit Kaaloa's case. Aplt. Br. at 26-28, 46-47; R. 293-94. Moreover,
Shelly, who knew Kaaloa and what he was capable of, and "[everybody" Shelly knew,
believed Kaaloa had committed the alleged murders, R. 293:117-18 (Addendum A);
Shelly said she had heard Kaaloa himself "bragging" about committing at least one of the
alleged murders, R. 293:118; the State must have believed Kaaloa was capable of
committing the alleged murders because it had charged him with a similar crime, R. 1-3;
the State did not refute or clarify the alleged murders evidence, thereby implying it
believed the evidence had been sufficiently covered by defense counsel, R. 293-94; and
the judge admitted the alleged murders evidence despite an objection by the State and an
4

off-the-record discussion. R. 205-06; 293:118. As far as the jury knew, Kaaloa had
already been tried and convicted of the alleged murders and defense counsel admitted the
alleged murders evidence in an effort to "'steal the thunder' from the [State's] revelation"
of the alleged murders. Sweitzer, 395 A.2d at 1383. In reality and as conceded by the
State, however, the alleged murders evidence was comprised of "baseless inculpatory
rumors and hearsay" that the State had no intention of attempting to produce at trial.
Aple. Br. at 18.
From the jury's perspective, the alleged murders evidence also had no connection
to the question of whether Shelly had a motive to lie at trial. Linking the alleged murders
evidence to Shelly's motives in testifying would have required the jury first to reject the
credibility of the alleged murders evidence, despite the absence of evidence or argument
refuting the allegations. R. 293-94. Second, to find Shelly knew the evidence was
untrue, despite her testimony that she and u[e]verybody" she knew believed the murder
allegations. R. 293:117-18. Third, to find Shelly was angry with Kaaloa because he
bought the truck, even though she never said as much. Id at 112-19. Fourth, to find
Shelly relayed the alleged murders information to the police in order to get Kaaloa in
trouble, even though no evidence suggested this was true and Shelly's need for assistance

1

Shelly's passing statement that the alleged murders evidence was hearsay, did
not diminish its believability. R. 293:117. Kaaloa was presented to the jury as a member
of the "pretty strange" drug world. Id. at 35, 40-41. The jury did not understand that
world, but Shelly did. Id. at 41; 294:103. Plus, Shelly knew Kaaloa personally, knew
what actions he was capable of, and knew the people he spent his time with. Id. This
background made Shelly's statements that she and "[ejverybody" she knew believed
Kaaloa had murdered three other people and that she had actually heard Kaaloa
"bragging" about one of the murders very believable. R. 293:117-18.
5

in recalling her statements to the police suggested she had no such motive. Id. at 117-18.
Finally, to link these findings together and conclude that collectively this information
somehow indicated Shelly had a motive to lie about the entirely separate incident for
which the State called her to testify. Id at 112-19. To have reached this conclusion with
guidance would have been a stretch, at the very least, but to have reached it in this case,
with no guidance whatsoever, would have been impossible. R. 293-94. Thus, defense
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when he crossexamined Shelly on the three murders allegedly committed by Kaaloa.
B.

Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness When He Failed to Object to the State's Admission of
Evidence In Violation of Rule 403.
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. "[Stipulation of fact by defense
counsel does not make evidence less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the
prosecution the opportunity of profiting from the 4 "legitimate moral force'" of its
evidence in persuading a jury." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,p7, 106 P.3d 734
(citations omitted). "Notwithstanding this general rule," rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence excludes evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice." State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989). In other
words, even if the evidence at issue is relevant, "'the State is bound to stipulate to facts,
to use an alternative mode of proof, or to forego introduction of the material if the
evidence it offers cannot satisfy rule 403.'" Id. (citation omitted).
6

Under rule 403, the probative value of evidence is measured by "the prosecutorial
need for the evidence." Florez, 777 P.2d at 456. Specifically, the "probative value" of
evidence is significantly "limited" if it only corroborates "uncontested facts" or the
credibility of a witness whose testimony is not "of great importance in the case and hotly
contested by the parties." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87^40, 57 P.3d 220; see State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66,^|53,52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003); State v. Wells,
603 P.2d 810, 813 (Utah 1979); State v. Poe, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968).
In this case, Kaaloa's argument that defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance by stipulating to the admission of the crime scene photographs and failing to
object to the medical examiner's description of Coates' decomposing body is based on
rule 403. Consequently, Kaaloa's concession at trial that he killed Coates (albeit in selfdefense) and obstructed justice by abandoning the body on the side of the road is critical
to this Court's analysis because, for rule 403 purposes, it significantly limited the
probative value of the challenged evidence. See Calliham, 2002 UT 87 at ^(40; Bluff,
2002 UT 66 at ^53; Wells, 603 P.2d at 813; Poe, 441 P.2d at 515.
As explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the crime scene photographs and the
medical examiner's testimony had very little, if any, probative value under rule 403
because they corroborated only uncontested facts such as: Coates' identity, that Coates
was dead, the cause of death, and the condition and location of Coates' body when it was
discovered. Aplt. Br. at 31. They revealed little, if anything, about the actual issue
before the jury: whether Kaaloa acted with the mens rea for murder or in self-defense.
R. 294:8-10, 15-19; State's Exhibits 1 & 2, Further, even if they did reveal something
7

about Kaaloa's state of mind, the same could have been revealed through much less
prejudicial evidence. See Florcz, 777 P.2d at 455 (holding '"State is bound to stipulate to
facts, to use an alternative mode of proof, or to forego introduction of the material if the
evidence it offers cannot satisfy rule 403.'" Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, for rule
403 purposes, the crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's testimony had
very little probative value because the main, if not sole, purpose for admitting the
evidence was to inflame and arouse the jury by illustrating in graphic aural and visual
detail the depravity with which Kaaloa treated the body after the altercation. Id,
On the other hand, as explained in Kaaloa's opening brief, the crime scene
photographs and the medical examiner's testimony created a great danger of unfair
prejudice. Aplt. Br. at 31-32. The crime scene photographs were enlarged, color
photographs of Coates' mostly naked, dirty, decomposing body as it was discovered—
abandoned on the side of the road and unnaturally contorted against the jagged rock that
stopped its slide down a steep, rocky slope. See State's Exhibits 1 & 2. And the medical
examiner provided a graphic description of the decomposed state of Coates' body and the
ways in which this necessitated disfiguring Coates' body during the autopsy. R. 294:8,
10, 16-17. Individually and collectively, this evidence created a great danger of unfair
prejudice that substantially outweighed what little, if any, probative value it offered.
C

Defense Counsel's Performance Fell Below an Objective Standard of
Reasonableness When He Failed to Move to Dismiss For Insufficient
Evidence or Object to the Lack of a Manslaughter Jury Instruction.
First, in conjunction with his argument that defense counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence, Kaaloa properly
8

marshaled the evidence supporting the murder conviction. Kaaloa was not required to
include in the marshaled evidence his "testimony that he continued beating Coates in the
head even after Coates was down." Aple. Br. at 29-30. A proper motion to dismiss
would have been raised at the close of the State's case when the only evidence before the
trial court for consideration would have been the evidence presented by the State. See
State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,^40, 70 P.3d 111 ("CA defendant's motion to dismiss for
insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court
to determine whether the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his
defense.'" (citations omitted); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,^9, 988 P.2d 949
(limiting review of sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the
motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case-in-chief... to the evidence adduced by
the prosecution in its case-in-chief '), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000). Instead,
Kaaloa properly included in the marshaled evidence the medical examiner's testimony
that the cause of death was "multiple blows" to the head and the fatal injury "could be"
consistent with a metal bat and would have rendered Coates "unconscious." Aplt. Br. at
36 (quoting R. 294:20-23).
Kaaloa also properly included with Barnes' statement that he heard Kaaloa say,
"The next time [Coates] takes a ride with me, he's not coming back," Barnes' follow-up
statement that he believed Kaaloa "was joking." Aple. Br. at 30. Barnes' complete
testimony was that he heard Kaaloa make a potentially threatening statement but believed
Kaaloa was joking. R. 293:148-49. The jury was free to believe or disbelieve any part of
this testimony, but Kaaloa, in marshaling the evidence in support of the verdict, was
9

required to place the complete testimony before this Court. See West Valley City v,
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding appellant must
present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists" (emphasis
omitted)). Anything less would have misrepresented the record. IdL
Finally, Kaaloa properly included Barnes' testimony that Kaaloa claimed
"Alfred's gang member friends killed Coates." Aple. Br. at 30. This evidence could
have been interpreted by the jury as supporting the State's case. R. 293:140. In fact, it
was the State that elicited this testimony from Barnes. Id. Thus, this Court should reach
Kaaloa's argument that defense counsel performed deficiently by failing to move to
dismiss for insufficient evidence because Kaaloa properly marshaled the evidence
supporting the murder conviction. Aplt. Br. at 34-36.
Second, the State presented insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
murder. The evidence supporting a conviction for murder, as listed by the State, was: (1)
prior to the altercation, Kaaloa made two statements that could have been interpreted as
threats to kill Coates; (2) during the altercation, Kaaloa hit Coates in the head with a
baseball bat up to four times, including after Coates had fallen to he ground; (3) after the
altercation, Kaaloa went to the grocery store to purchase beer instead of attempting to
resuscitate Coates or summon help; and (4) Kaaloa abandoned Coates' body on the side
of the road. Aple. Br. at 19-20, 28.
The remaining evidence presented at trial, as demonstrated by the marshaled
evidence, showed Coates, while under the influence of drugs and alcohol, sought out
10

Kaaloa in order to confront him about the truck; Coates found Kaaloa relaxing and
barefoot at home; Kaaloa and Coates fought; Coates had control of the machete before
and during the fight; Kaaloa struck Coates with the bat approximately four times; and
after the altercation, Kaaloa's apartment looked like a struggle had occurred and Kaaloa
was limping and had a swollen left hand. R. 293-94; Aplt. Br. at 34-36. Taken as a
whole, the evidence presented at trial strongly corroborated Kaaloa's claim of selfdefense and, at best, proved only manslaughter. The State itself apparently recognized
this and argued only that Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a "fit of rage." R.
293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58. Thus, defense counsel acted deficiently when he failed to
move to dismiss for insufficient evidence.
Third, defense counsel's failure, at the very least, to request a manslaughter
instruction was not "' within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance'"
because, under the circumstances of this case, "no conceivable legitimate tactic or
strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465,
468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). The State surmises defense counsel's
strategy was to "forego a manslaughter instruction in order to secure an acquittal for his
client." Aple. Br. at 35. Even if the State's supposition is correct, however, defense
counsel's performance was still deficient.
The evidence presented at trial, if believed, was legally insufficient to prove
murder, and, at best, proved only manslaughter. See Aplt. Br. at 41-43. The State
apparently recognized this and argued Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a
"fit of rage." R. 293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58. By failing to request a manslaughter jury
11

instruction, defense counsel did not make it any more likely the jury would acquit
Kaaloa. See State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983) (uTo expect a jury to . . . find
a defendant innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence establishes beyond
doubt that he is guilty of some violent crime requires of our juries clinical detachment
from the reality of human experience." (citation omitted)). Instead, he virtually
guaranteed a murder conviction, despite the lack of evidence, if the jury believed the
State's argument that Kaaloa was guilty of some violent crime because the only other
alternative was acquittal. SCQ id. ("Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to
resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.").
D.

But For Defense Counsel's Deficient Performance, There Is a Reasonable
Probability the Outcome of the Trial Would Have Been Different.
The evidence supporting Kaaloa's conviction of murder was far from

overwhelming. The only evidence supporting a conviction for murder, as listed by the
State, was: (1) prior to the altercation, Kaaloa made two statements that could have been
interpreted as threats to kill Coates; (2) during the altercation, Kaaloa hit Coates in the
head with a baseball bat up to four times, including after Coates had fallen to he ground;
(3) after the altercation, Kaaloa went to the grocery store to purchase beer instead of
attempting to resuscitate Coates or summon help; and (4) Kaaloa abandoned Coates'
body on the side of the road. Aple. Br. at 19-20, 28.
The remaining evidence presented at trial showed Coates, while under the
influence of drugs and alcohol, sought out Kaaloa in order to confront him about the
12

truck; Coates found Kaaloa relaxing and barefoot at home; Kaaloa and Coates fought;
Coates had control of the machete before and during the fight; Kaaloa struck Coates with
the bat approximately four times; after the altercation, Kaaloa5s apartment looked like a
struggle had occurred and Kaaloa was limping and had a swollen left hand; and after the
altercation, in addition to the seemingly irrational acts of shopping for beer and
abandoning Coates' body on the side of the road, Kaaloa allowed people into his home
while Coates' body was still present. R. 293-94. Taken as a whole, the evidence
presented at trial strongly corroborated Kaaloa's claim of self-defense and, at best,
proved only manslaughter. Aplt. Br. at 36-38, 48-49. The State itself apparently
recognized this and argued only that Kaaloa was guilty because he killed Coates in a "fit
of rage." R. 293:38; 294:142-44, 156-58.
In light of the weak evidence supporting Kaaloa's conviction for murder, there is a
reasonable likelihood the outcome of the trial would have been different but for defense
counsel's admission of the alleged murders evidence, failure to object to the State's
admission of the crime scene photographs and the medical examiner's description of
Coates' decomposing body, and/or failure to move to dismiss for insufficient evidence or
request a manslaughter instruction. See Aplt. Br. at 43-50 (explanation of prejudicial
effect of defense counsel's deficient actions both individually and collectively).
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CONCLUSION
Kaaloa respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a
new trial.
SUBMITTED this _15_ day of August, 2006.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

O ^ - c ^ o l n w NvSL
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

)

Plaintiff,

)
Case No. 041905376

VS.

)

ROBIN LANCE KAALOA

) TRANSCRIPT OF:
JURY TRIAL
) VOLUME I

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK

THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1860

PILED DISTRICT G0URT
t h u d Judicial District

TRANSCRIPT OF:

)C T 2 «• >005

JURY TRIAL
VOLUME I

ByDeputy C!?rk

JUNE 14, 2005

ORlGiHAL
REPORTED BY:
_

Michelle B. Beatty, RPR, CSR'ITO
(801) 238-7106
... - p E O - V r

DOT 2 b :X5
<rC4-~Z^

No further questions.
THE COURT:

Very well.

Any cross-examination, Mr. Chacon.
MR. CHACON:

Yes.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. CHACON:
Q.

Ms. Smith, do you recall being interviewed by agent

Doug Miller on August 2004 regarding this particular case?
A.

We had quite a few interviews about this case.

Q.

This would have been the interview that took place at

the Smith's grocery store at about 12th West and 600 North?
A.

Yeah, yeah I remember that one.

Q.

At that time had you smoked methamphetamine?

Do you

recall being under the influence of methamphetamine?
A.

That day, I don f t remember.

Q.

Okay.

And do you recall a conversation about

Mr. Kaaloa supposedly having killed other people?
A.

That was hearsay to me.

Urn, I heard that off and on.

Q.

And you mentioned that to the detective; correct?

A.

To tell you the truth, I don't remember if I said

anything like that at all.
Q.

Let me give you a little background about the

exchange between you and the detective and see if that
refreshes your memory.
A.

Okay.
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1

Q.

It was about you indicating that supposedly there had

2

been a murder right by the railroad tracks and the warehouse,

3

and that they had got some drugs.

4

And Detective Miller says, "Okay."

5

And you responded:

"And that was at another house.

6

Then he was telling me, bragging, this is what I called it,

7

somebody something that he had beat the shit out of, and they

8

had buried someone by the railroad tracks and warehouse."

9

MR. HARMS:

Your Honor, I'm going to object before

10

she answers and ask for a moment to discuss with Mr. Chacon

11

something.

12

THE COURT:

Go ahead.

(Off-the-record

13
14

MR. HARMS:

15

Q.

discussion.)

Thank you, Your Honor.

(BY MR. CHACON)

And then do you recall further

16

conversation with Detective Miller about two other girls having

17

been killed in Mr. Kaaloa's residence?

18
19

A.

That was something that I had heard, but I -- I may

have mentioned it to him.

20

Q.

Okay.

21

been killed?

22

A.

23

missing, too.

24

Q.

And Jackie Allred told you that?

25 I

A.

Yes, I remember that conversation.

Yeah.

That presumably an Adrian and a Jennifer had

Everybody thought he had because they were
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MR. CHACON:

That's all I have.

2

THE COURT:

All right.

3

MR. HARMS:

No, Your Honor, may she be excused?

4

THE COURT:

Yes. Ms. Smith, you may step down, and

5

you're free to go.

Is there anything further?

Thank you.

6

THE WITNESS:

Thank you.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BURMESTER:

Call your next witness.
Robert Barnes.

10

ROBERT BARNES

11

Called by the State, having been duly

12

sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

13

THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

14

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be

15

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

16

you God?

17 |

THE WITNESS:

18 I

THE COURT:

19 I

THE WITNESS:

You may be seated here, sir,
Okay.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

20
21

I do.

BY MR. BURMESTER:

22

Q.

Good afternoon, Robert.

23

A.

Good afternoon.

24

Q.

Will you please give us your full name, and spell

25

your last name.
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